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Abstract
In their recent book Merchants of Doubt [New York:Bloomsbury 2010], Naomi Oreskes and
Erik Conway describe the “tobacco strategy”, which was used by the tobacco industry to
influence policy makers regarding the health risks of tobacco products. The strategy involved
two parts, consisting of (1) promoting and sharing independent research supporting the
industry’s preferred position and (2) funding additional research, but selectively publishing
the results. We introduce a model of the Tobacco Strategy, and use it to argue that both
prongs of the strategy can be extremely effective—even when policy makers rationally update
on all evidence available to them. As we elaborate, this model helps illustrate the conditions
under which the Tobacco Strategy is particularly successful. In addition, we show how
journalists engaged in ‘fair’ reporting can inadvertently mimic the effects of industry on
public belief.
1. Introduction
In December 1952, Readers Digest—the publication with the largest circulation in the world
at the time—published an article with the title “Cancer by the Carton” (Norr [1952]).1
Coming on the heels of a period during which smoking rates had risen significantly, the
article brought the growing body of evidence that cigarette smoking caused cancer to the
attention of a wide audience. Six months later, a group of doctors at Sloan-Kettering
Memorial Hospital completed a study in which they demonstrated that mice painted with
Email addresses: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall), cailino@uci.edu (Cailin O’Connor),
justinpbruner@gmail.com (Justin P. Bruner)
1The history presented in these opening paragraphs draws heavily on the account given by Oreskes and
Conway [2010, Ch. 1]. Note that the chronology we describe differs slightly from theirs, as they report
that the Reader’s Digest article was published in the wake of the 1953 Wynder article, whereas in fact it
appeared almost a year earlier. See also the discussion in O’Connor and Weatherall [2019].
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cigarette tar developed malignant carcinomas (Wynder et al. [1953]). To a public already
primed by the Reader’s Digest article, this paper provided a direct and visceral link between
a known by-product of smoking and fatal cancer. It produced a media frenzy, with articles
reporting the result in a number of national newspapers and magazines.
The tobacco industry panicked. The heads of six major U.S. tobacco companies con-
tracted with the New York public relations firm Hill and Knowlton to combat claims that
their product had serious adverse health effects. At a meeting in December of 1953, they
agreed on a novel strategy: they would fight science with science. In 1954 they hired a promi-
nent geneticist, C. C. Little, to run the newly create Tobacco Industry Research Committee
(TIRC). The goal of this committee was ostensibly to support and promote research on the
health effects of tobacco. But in fact, it was a propaganda machine whose principal activity
was to find, fund, and promote scientific research that contradicted the growing consensus
that smoking kills. The goal was to create a false sense of uncertainty and controversy, so
as to delay policy change in the service of public health.
As historians Oreskes and Conway [2010] painstakingly document, drawing on documents
released as part of a series of lawsuits in the 1990s, the tobacco industry initiated this
strategy—which Oreskes and Conway dub the “Tobacco Strategy”—despite the fact that
their own internal research had already established a link between smoking and various
health risks.2 The Tobacco Strategy had multiple parts. One part, which we will call selective
sharing, consisted of identifying and promoting research produced independently of industry
that happened to support the industry’s preferred position. For instance, in 1954 the TIRC
distributed a pamphlet entitled “A Scientific Perspective on the Cigarette Controversy” to
nearly 200,000 doctors, journalists, and policy-makers, in which they emphasized favorable
research and questioned results supporting the contrary view. A second part of the Tobacco
Strategy, which we will call biased production, consisted of funding their own research, either
through in-house scientists or by offering research grants to scientists pursuing research
activities that the industry supported, and then publishing the results of that research only
if it supported industry views.
Oreskes and Conway [2010] make a compelling case both that the Tobacco Strategy was
self-consciously adopted by industry to influence public opinion, and that those goals were
apparently achieved. They also argue that the Tobacco Strategy succeeded, in the sense
of playing a causal role in realizing these ends. But the historical analysis they provide is
necessarily in situ, and the details are complex. It is difficult to clearly distinguish the causal
role played by the TIRC’s activities from other cultural and psychological considerations
that may have influenced public opinion and slowed policy-change, such as the facts that
smoking was culturally ingrained, including among doctors and legislators, and that the
tobacco industry made significant political contributions. One might worry that it was over-
determined that cultural and political change regarding tobacco would be slow, so that it is
not clear that the Tobacco Strategy played a significant role.
In this paper, we attempt to strengthen the causal link between the Tobacco Strategy and
public opinion by proposing and analyzing an agent-based model of the Tobacco Strategy.
2For other discussions of this strategy, see for instance Michaels and Monforton [2005]; Michaels [2008].
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Our model is based on the network epistemology framework introduced by Bala and Goyal
[1998], later adapted to philosophy of science by Zollman [2007], and used more recently
by Holman and Bruner [2015, 2017] to study industry effects on science.3 This approach
allows us to test counterfactual effects of industry propaganda on public belief, free from
compounding factors.4 As we will argue, our model provides evidence that the Tobacco
Strategy can, in principle, be very effective. We also provide important insight into how
(and when) it works. As we will argue, the Tobacco Strategy trades on the fact that
empirical research into difficult, probabilistic problems will yield results that, individually,
support more than one position. It is only by viewing a maximal, unbiased sample of the
output of a research community that one can hope to come to hold reliable beliefs about the
problem at hand. This means that even subtle manipulations, not in the scientific record
itself, but in the sample of that record that one is exposed to, can have disproportionate
impact on one’s beliefs5.
An important take-away from these arguments is that what may seem like weak or
subtle interventions are often most effective for the would-be propagandist. In particular,
outright scientific fraud—intentional publication of incorrect, fabricated, or purposely mis-
leading results—is not only unnecessary to influence public opinion on topics of scientific
inquiry, it is also riskier and often less effective than other forms of manipulation. Biased
production, which does not involve fabricating results, is a successful strategy for mislead-
ing the public. And in many cases, biased production is itself less effective than selective
sharing—even though it involves more direct and explicit interventions on the production of
science. These observations support claims by Holman and Bruner [2017] that more subtle
industry influences—like their “industrial selection”, which we will discuss at length in the
conclusion of this paper—can be very effective. In fact, as we will also argue in what follows,
even interventions with no malicious intent, such as those of journalists who aim to be “fair”
in their reporting on controversial science, can unwittingly mimic the effects of an active
propagandist.
Before proceeding, we wish to emphasize what is at stake in this discussion. Recognizing
how the Tobacco Strategy works is essential for understanding the relationship between
science, public policy, and democracy. There is now a large literature in philosophy of science
3Similar methods are used by O’Connor and Weatherall [2019], O’Connor and Weatherall [2017], and
Weatherall and O’Connor [2018] to discuss the propagation of false beliefs in social networks more generally.
4 To be clear, we take this ability to intervene in our model to be the key aspect that helps us strengthen
the causal link between the Tobacco Strategy and public policy related to tobacco products. The model
allows us to test where and how the presence of a propagandist can influence public belief. It also lets us
explore the effects of a propagandist in isolation from other potential causal factors. That said, we do not
claim that the factors we consider here are the only relevant causal factors, nor that other models could
not be used to identify other counterfactual relationships and possible causal factors. For more on the
interventionist account of causation that is lurking in the background here, see Woodward [2003]; see also
note 8 for more on the relationship between the model we discuss and “how-possibly” modeling.
5This conclusion is in line with prior work in social epistemology exploring how subjects come to form
incorrect beliefs on the basis of selective reporting (for an overview, see Romero [2016]). We demonstrate how
the public can be systematically mislead even in those circumstances where all experiments are published
and scientists exhibit no bias in favor of industry.
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on what it means for science to be suitably “democratic,” in the sense of reflecting the needs
and values of the members of a society affected by scientific results.6 This literature focuses
on how democratic ideals should shape scientific research. But the other direction, of how to
best understand the role that scientific knowledge plays in democratic institutions, is equally
important—and requires us to reckon with the fact that there are powerful political and
economic interests that wish to manipulate and interfere with the distribution of scientific
knowledge. Understanding the mechanisms by which public understanding of science can fail
is crucial to developing institutions and interventions which might be effective in defanging
the Tobacco Strategy, and, in the case of ‘fair’ reporting, improving journalistic practice to
protect public belief.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. In the next section we will
introduce the model we consider in the paper. Sections 3 and 4 will present results concerning
selective sharing and biased production, respectively. Section 5 will describe results from
a slightly modified model in which we consider ways in which journalistic practice with no
malicious intent can simulate the actions of a propagandist. We will conclude with some
reflections on the results, including a discussion of possible interventions.
2. Epistemic Network Models
Bala and Goyal [1998] introduce a model where individuals in a community try to choose
which of two theories, or practices, is the better one. In order to decide, they make use
evidence from two sources. First, each individual tests the theory they favor, and second,
they share their results with those in their social network. Over time, they update their
beliefs about the theories based on this evidence, until, in many cases, the whole group comes
to believe that one or the other is better. Zollman [2007, 2010] shows how simulations of
this model can be applied to understand scientific discovery and consensus. Under his
interpretation, each individual in the model is a scientist testing a hypothesis. For instance,
suppose a new treatment for cancer is introduced. How do researchers go about deciding
whether to adopt the new treatment or stick with the old one?
The model starts with a network, defined by a set of scientists and a set of fixed links
representing pathways of communication between them. Inquiry is modeled using what is
called a two-armed bandit problem. Each scientist is aware that there are two actions they
can perform. Action A is well understood, and is known to be successful 50% of the time.
Action B, on the other hand, is less well understood, and the agents are uncertain whether
it is more or less successful than A. In particular, the instantiation of the model we use here
assumes that B is a bit better than A, so that its chance of success is pB = .5+.
7 Scientists,
however, do not know whether it is a bit better, or a bit worse (success rate .5−). Their aim
is then to discover which of these possibilities is the better one, and so adopt the superior
6See, for instance, Longino [1990, 2002], Kitcher [2003, 2011], Douglas [2009], Elliott [2011], and references
therein.
7The payoff of success for both actions is the same, and failure yields no payoff, so action B has a strictly
higher expected payoff.
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action. In what follows, we will refer to “theory A” as the view that action A is preferable,
and “theory B” as the view that action B is preferable.
At the beginning of a simulation, scientists are given random credences about which
theory is better, represented by numbers between 0 and 1. (For example, a scientist with
credence .7 believes there is a 70% chance that theory B is right.) Each round, scientists
apply their preferred theory to the world. Agents with a credence < .5 believe that theory
A is probably correct and employ it. Agents with credence > .5, on the other hand, use
theory B. This might correspond to doctors who approve of a new treatment deciding to try
it on patients, while others stick with a more conservative approach.
In each round, scientists observe how their choices worked, and change their beliefs in
light of new evidence. In particular, it is assumed that they test their theory some number
of times, n. They then update their credence using Bayes’ rule based on what they, and
all their network neighbors, have observed. Simulations stop when either all agents believe
in theory A—and so do not learn anything new about theory B—or when all agents have
reached some certainty threshold (say .99 credence) that B is correct, and so are exceedingly
unlikely to end up changing their minds. Both outcomes occur in simulations. Sometimes
initial beliefs and/or strings of data supporting theory A are enough to create a mistaken
consensus around the worse theory, and sometimes the community gets enough good data
to settle on the better one.
As noted in the introduction, we are particularly interested in the role of industry, and
propagandists in general, in shaping policy based on science, and in influencing popular
belief. For this reason, our models follow the framework developed by Bala and Goyal
[1998] and Zollman [2007], but with a few, key alterations. First, we introduce a new set of
agents, which we will call policy makers. These agents have beliefs, and update these in light
of evidence, but do not gather evidence themselves. Each one listens to some, or all, of the
scientists in the network, but does not influence them or anyone else. We assume that at the
beginning of each simulation, policy makers are skeptical about the new, uncertain theory,
in the sense that their initial credences are sampled from a uniform distribution supported
on the interval (0, .5).
We also introduce one further agent that we call the propagandist. This agent observes
all the scientists, and communicates with all the policy makers. Their goal is to convince
the policy makers to prefer the worse theory A, by sharing evidence that suggests action A
is preferable to action B. We consider two treatments, corresponding to different strategies
by which the propagandist may do this. The idea is to represent an individual, or set of
individuals, who are motivated to use all their resources to publicize data that is ultimately
misinformation. The actions of the propagandist capture various aspects of the Tobacco
Strategy: by sharing a biased sample of evidence with policy makers (and the public) they
seek to divide public opinion from scientific consensus.8
8 It is common in discussions of idealized models of epistemic communities—and philosophical discussion
of modeling in the social sciences generally—to suppose that such models provide, at best, “how-possibly”
information about a target phenomenon. (See Frey and Sˇesˇelja [2018] for a discussion of this view.) We
wish to explicitly reject this attitude, at least with regard to the inferences we draw from the present
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3. Selective Sharing
In the first treatment, which we call selective sharing, the propagandist adopts the following
strategy: in each round of the simulation, they search the network of scientists for results
that tend to favor theory A, and then they share only those results with the policy makers.
The policy makers then update their credence in light of both the evidence they receive from
the scientists to whom they are connected and the evidence received from the propagandist,
which includes a subset of the results produced by the scientists.9 In other words, each policy
maker receives, and updates on, a biased sample of evidence including a disproportionate
number of results favoring theory A. However, all of the results the policy makers receive are
“real” in the sense that they are produced by members of the scientific community, without
bias or influence by the propagandist or anyone else. In addition, the propagandist does
nothing to influence the scientific community; they only seek to shape policy maker beliefs.10
We analyze this model by varying parameter values including the number of scientists
in the network, K, the number of draws each round, n, the probability that action B is
successful, pB = .5 + , and the number of scientists each policy maker listens to, k.
11 (Each
policy maker could connect to one scientist, or to two, or to three, etc.) We consider models
where the network of scientists is either a cycle, where each scientist is connected to two
peers in a ring structure, or a complete network, where every scientist communicates with
every other. Figure 1 shows these two structures. They differ in that it will tend to take
longer for the cycle to converge to a consensus, especially for large communities, because
fewer scientists share data with each other. This network structure affects our results, as
we will make clear, mainly by influencing the amount of time it takes the communities of
scientists to reach consensus. All reported results were averaged over 1k runs of simulation
model. On our view, there is ample and convincing historical evidence that the tobacco industry has
intervened to influence public beliefs using strategies very similar to the ones discussed here. The present
model supplements this historical evidence by allowing us to ask counterfactual questions concerning how
precisely this kind of intervention works. For this reason, we adopt the position that our model provides
“how-potentially” information concerning the causal role of this sort of intervention. What we mean by
this is that the model is realistic enough to explore processes that have the potential to really occur. In
this sense, we take this model to lie somewhere on a spectrum between “how-possibly” and “how-actually”
(i.e., fully realistic) models. Exploring how-potentially models can direct further inquiry into whether at
these processes are really at play, or (as in this case) supplement existing empirical work on these processes
(Rosenstock et al. [2017]). See also 4. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify
our stance on these issues, and for emphasizing that these models lie on a spectrum (a point with which we
agree).
9As we discuss below, this model involves some double-counting of results favorable to theory A, as a
given policy maker may receive the same evidence from both a scientist and from the propagandist.
10In this way, the model we consider differs significantly from that of Holman and Bruner [2015], who
consider an industry scientist who influences other scientific beliefs. We will return to this relationship in the
next section, as the treatment discussed there is somewhat closer to that discussed by Holman and Bruner.
11We consider subsets of the following parameter values: population size K = 4, 6, 10, 20, 50, number of
draws n = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1000, success of better theory pB = .51, .55, .575, .6, .7, and number of
scientists listened to by each policy maker ranges from 1 to all of them. Our choices were influenced, to
some degree, by tractability considerations; simulations with low pB and many scientists, in particular, took
longer to run.
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that terminated when either correct or incorrect consensus was reached.12
Figure 1: Cycle and complete network structures.
We find that the presence of a single propagandist who communicates only actual findings
of (ideal, unbiased) epistemically motivated scientists can have a startling influence on the
beliefs of policy makers. No one in this scenario is doing bad science. No one is falsifying
data, or even publishing it selectively. The propagandist communicates only real scientific
findings. Nonetheless, under many scenarios we find that while the community of scientists
converges on true beliefs about the world, the policy makers reach near certainty in the false
belief. This point will become clearer as we share results in this section and the next—for
a wide range of parameter values, public belief is highly accurate when no propagandist is
at play, but as inaccurate as it could possibly be under the influence of the propagandist.
We find that the likelihood of this sort of disagreement between science and public belief
depends on features of the community and the problem studied. First, unsurprisingly, when
policy makers listen to more scientists they are harder to deceive. Figure 2 shows the
average credence that policy makers have in the correct theory at the point where scientists
reach a correct consensus, which we understand as a state in which all members of the
scientific community have credence greater than .99. The x-axis tracks the proportion of
scientists in the entire community that each policy maker consults. As we can see, without
a propagandist, public beliefs lag behind scientific beliefs slightly, though the more scientists
are consulted, the better the public does. With a propagandist, the public is convinced that
the false theory is preferable, though if they are connected to more scientists, this effect is
ameliorated.13 In related work, Holman and Bruner [2015] model the effects of industrial
propagandists who share biased data with scientists and observe that it is best for scientists
to be highly connected to each other in such cases.14
12We ignore outcomes where scientists do not converge to the correct belief. (In these cases, policy makers
also tend to accept the worse theory.) This means that our results are averaged over fewer than 1k rounds.
In the worst case scenario, though, this only meant ignoring 10% of data points.
13These results are a cycle network with K = 20, n = 10, and pB = .55. This trend occurred across all
parameter values, as did the other trends reported unless otherwise specified.
14This shows how the suggestion from Zollman [2007, 2010] that less connected scientific communities are
more successful at reaching the truth does not hold when industry attempts to sway consensus.
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Figure 2: Policy maker beliefs as influenced by their connections to scientists.
It is also harder to deceive policy makers when the size of the effect—i.e., the difference
in expected payoff between action A and B—is larger. As pB (the probability that the bet-
ter action pays off) increases, so that the difference between the better and worse theories
is more stark, the policy makers are more likely to learn the truth. This is because there
are fewer studies that happen to support the worse theory, and thus less material for the
propagandist to publicize. Figure 3 shows how as the difference between the success rates of
the two theories increases, policy makers tend to end up holding the true belief regardless of
propaganda.15 This observation is especially relevant to the biomedical sciences, because hu-
man bodies are highly variable, which means that data is often highly equivocal. We should
expect studies of human subjects to provide plenty of material for potential propagandists
looking to obscure true evidential trends.
The number of draws each round, n, also has a strong effect on the ability of the propa-
gandist to mislead. This parameter may be thought of as the sample size for each experiment
performed by the scientists. For fixed pB (i.e., fixed effect size), it is roughly analogous to
the statistical power of each scientist’s experiments: the higher it is, the less likely that a
study will erroneously support theory A.16 Thus scientists who run the equivalent of well-
15Results are for K = 20 scientists in a cycle, each policy maker listening to 50% of scientists (k = 10),
and n = 10. Again the trend is stable across parameter values.
16More precisely, if we take the null hypothesis to be that that PB < PA, and the alternative hypothesis to
be that PB > PA, then for virtually any hypothesis test one considers, if we fix the effect size,  = |PB − .5|,
increasing n will increase statistical power in the sense that it will increase the probability that the false null
hypothesis is rejected in favor of the true alternative hypothesis. Of course, our agents are Bayesians, and
so frequentist notions such as power are not strictly relevant—the agents update their beliefs in light of any
and all evidence that they receive. Still, thinking of n as roughly tracking power is useful, here, because it
gives an intuitive sense of why small n studies are generally better for the propagandist.
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Figure 3: Policy maker beliefs as influenced by the difficulty of the scientific problem.
powered studies and produce fewer spurious results also produce less for the propagandist
to work with. Figure 4 shows the final average beliefs of policy makers with and without a
propagandist as n increases.17 Note that the x-axis is on a log scale to make the trend more
visible. For high enough n, the propagandist can do almost nothing since they very rarely
have the spurious results necessary to mislead the public. In these cases, policy makers
figure out the truth despite the propagandist’s efforts.18
One might think that increasing the number of scientists in a network, K, holding all
else fixed, would decrease the effectiveness of the propagandist. More scientists means more
data, and more epistemically motivated minds searching for truth. But this does not occur
in general in these models. Assume that policy makers listen to some fixed number of
scientists, k. This is not an unreasonable assumption given limits on the amount of time
and energy policy makers or the public devote to science. In such cases, as the total number
of scientists increases, there is no benefit to policy makers, since they continue to listen to k
scientists. On the other hand, the increased number of scientists increases the total number
of spurious results that the propagandist can then share with policy makers, often worsening
policy maker belief.19 In the next section, we will engage in some further discussion of the
17This figure is for K = 10 scientists in a complete network, each policy maker listening to 90% of
scientists, and pB = .55.
18In an interesting connection, Holman and Bruner [2015] find that when a propagandist shares biased
data with scientists, and when these scientists are able to ignore data that is statistically unlikely given their
credences, scientists do better when n is large. This is for a different reason than we describe. When n is
large in their models, it is easier to detect a propagandist and ignore them. If n is small, more results are
statistically likely given some agent’s credence.
19This is not always the case since as we outline in the Appendix the size of the community also influences
the speed of convergence to scientific consensus, which can influence policy maker beliefs.
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Figure 4: Policy maker beliefs as influenced by the amount of data gathered by scientists.
effects that the size of the scientific community has on policy maker beliefs.
The final consideration that influences the success of the propagandist has to do with how
much time it takes for the scientific community to converge to consensus. The convergence
time depends on various factors. For instance, the size of a network generally influences
how long it takes for all scientists to reach agreement. (In a sparsely connected network,
more scientists means a longer time until each one is convinced.) In addition, as mentioned
above, for fixed population size the cycle and complete network arrangements differ in that
cycle networks take longer to converge. This is because scientists listen to fewer of their
colleagues, meaning that disagreements will tend to persist as actors in different parts of the
network gather different sorts of data.
Previous results from Zollman [2007, 2010] have shown that in many cases factors that
slow convergence can be beneficial for an epistemic community. These factors lead to tran-
sient diversity of opinion, which is important for preventing scientists from settling too
quickly on a theory that might be wrong. Heavily connected communities, on the other
hand, are easily swayed by strings of misleading evidence that are widely shared.20 But
our results show that other considerations can complicate this issue. When industrial actors
have a stake in a community’s findings, taking a long time to settle on consensus can provide
more opportunity for the propagandist to find and promote results that went the wrong way
under conditions where spurious results are likely.
To try and better understand the relationship between time to convergence of the sci-
entific network and the effectiveness of the propagandist, we derive semi-analytic results
20Rosenstock et al. [2017] show that this will only occur for the region of parameter space in which the
problem of selecting the better theory is hard (due to there being fewer scientists, less difference between
theories, or lower n).
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predicting expected outcomes in this model. In general, we can think of each policy maker’s
belief as influenced by two separate factors. One comes from the community of scientists,
which, on average, will tend to pull credences in theory B up. The other comes from the
propagandist and will tend to pull credence in theory B down. In other words, a policy
maker’s belief in round t+ 1 of simulation on average can be represented by:
B(t+1) = YP × YS ×Bt,
where Bt is their prior belief, and YP and YS represent the average effects of the propagandist
and scientists. In the appendix, we derive expressions for these quantities and show that it
will always be the case that YP < 1 and YS > 1.
We can thus think of the dynamics in this model as a sort of tug of war between science
and industry over public belief. In general, for any set of parameter values in our model,
and some state of scientist/policy maker beliefs, one side will be winning because either
YP × YS < 1 or YP × YS > 1.21 This means that when the propagandist is winning on
average, they do better during long periods of scientific debate. In such cases, policy makers
do better when scientists quickly reach consensus. Conversely, when the YP × YS > 1
more evidence will tend to to lead the policy makers towards the true belief—with the
propagandist’s main effect being to slow this progress.22
For an example of the effects of time to convergence on belief, consider figure 5, which
shows the beliefs of policy makers consulting cycle and complete networks. We show results
in a scenario that favors true belief—pB = .7 and n = 20—and also one that disfavors it—
pB = .55 and n = 5. In the first case, the slower cycle network gives policy makers time to
learn the correct theory from scientists, while relatively unencumbered by the propagandist.
In the second case, the faster complete network gives the propagandist less time to share
spurious data, and so is better for policy makers.
To be clear, if we look again at the simulation results we have presented, we can observe
that, since policy makers, on average, start simulation at credence .25, any outcome where
their final beliefs are < .25 is one where the propagandist is pulling harder than the scientists,
and vice versa. If we imagined that the process kept going—scientists kept performing action
B, and the propagandist kept publicizing spurious results—we would expect policy makers
to become completely convinced in either A or B eventually, with the relative values of YS
and YP determining which one. But the community can end up at a better or worse state
depending how quickly this happens. The most important take-away here is that there are
reasons to think that a long argumentative process between scientists might actually be
a bad thing when public belief is on the line. Thus we find a curious trade-off with the
Zollman effect: at least in some cases, maximizing convergence time is truth conducive for
the scientists, but not for the public.
21The situation in which the two influences exactly cancel is a knife’s edge case.
22One interesting observation is that the size of the scientific network, besides influencing time to conver-
gence, also influences the rate at which policy makers change their beliefs. Adding more scientists increases
the total amount of data both coming directly from scientists and coming from the propagandist. When
the scientists are winning the tug of war, this increase benefits the policy makers. When the propagandist
is winning, this simply increases the rate at which policy makers decrease their credence in PB .
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Figure 5: Influence of scientific network structure on policy maker beliefs.
In the next section, we will move on to discuss the second part of the Tobacco Strategy—
where industry funds their own scientists and disseminates the resulting research. Before
doing so, we mention a few potential concerns about the models just discussed, and robust-
ness checks meant to alleviate those concerns. First, as noted above, data in our model can
be “double counted” in the sense that a policy maker might update their belief on data from
a scientist and then update on the same evidence as it comes from the propagandist. We
take this to be a feature, rather than a bug, because it captures how the prevalence and
repetition of evidence can increase its impact. Nonetheless, we also ran the same simulations
where data could not be double counted this way. Results were qualitatively similar, though
the strength of the propagandist was diminished, particularly for policy makers connected to
many scientists. We also varied the pattern with which policy makers connected to scientists
to ensure that this did not have a significant effect on the results.
4. Biased Production
As mentioned in the introduction, another part of the Tobacco Strategy involved producing
industry-funded data that could be used to counter the research coming from the scientific
community.23 Our second treatment concerns this aspect of the strategy. To model this, we
23There is a close connection here to the work of Holman and Bruner [2015], who consider biased agents
in a scientific community. Like our “biased production” propagandist, their “intransigently biased agent”
(IBA) produces and shares evidence that tends to favor the wrong theory. However, in their case the IBA
draws from a biased arm relative to the other scientists in the community, whereas, as we describe, our
propagandist performs the same actions as the scientists but selectively publishes results. In addition, they
focus on the effect an IBA might have on beliefs within a scientific community, showing how industry can
shape scientific consensus itself, rather than public belief in particular.
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now assume that the propagandist has their own resources that they can allocate towards
gathering data about the uncertain theory B. After gathering this data, the propagandist
then shares only those studies that spuriously indicated that theory A was the better one.
Notice that we do not allow the propagandist to do ‘bad science’ in the sense of falsifying
data, or to use biased methodologies. Their data gathering process is, in fact, identical
to scientists attempting to find the truth. The only intervention we allow on the scientific
process is one that is currently widely practiced (and not always considered particularly
unethical): selectively choosing not to publish some results.
We varied several new parameter values in this treatment. First, we varied the total
amount of resources available to the propagandist. (Think of this as the total number of
pulls from a bandit arm the propagandist can perform.) We also varied how the propagandist
chose to divide up these resources into studies. Did they run many low powered studies, or
just a few high powered ones?24
In this scenario, holding other parameters fixed, more scientists are unequivocally ben-
eficial to policy makers’ beliefs. Scientists no longer unintentionally provide grist for the
propagandist, and, instead, produce and publicize data that is more likely to point in the
right direction. It is also consistently better, as in the last section, for policy makers to
consult more scientists. The more data they receive from epistemically motivated actors,
the less the impact of the propagandists’ spurious studies on their beliefs. And, again, the
better the successful theory, the lower the chance that the propagandist generates enough
spurious results to influence policy makers.
Unsurprisingly, more resources are better for the propagandist. If they have the where-
withal to run more studies, they have a greater chance of generating results supporting
theory A. Suppose each scientist has the resources to collect 10 data points per trial. As-
sume that the propagandist runs trials of the same size, but can run a different number of
these depending on their level of resources. As figure 6 shows, as this number increases, the
likelihood that the policy makers believe the correct theory goes down.25
Suppose that we hold fixed the resources a propagandist has at their disposal. The last
question we ask is: given this, what is the best way for the propagandist to allocate these
resources to different studies? The answer is that it is always better for them to break
their data up into the smallest possible chunks. Suppose the propagandist has resources
to collect 1000 data points. In the most extreme case, we could imagine a scenario where
the propagandist runs 1000 studies with one draw each. They could then report only those
where action B failed (on average this would be (.5−)∗1000 data points), making it look to
policy makers as if action B was never successful in these experiments. At the other extreme,
the propagandist would run a single experiment with 1000 data points. The chances that
24We ran simulations for a subset of the following parameter values: population size = 4, 6, 10, 20, number
of draws n = 1, 2, 10, 25, 50, 100, success of better theory pB = .55, .6, .7., and number of scientists consulted,
k, ranged from 1 to all of them. Propagandist total resources varied from equal to that of one scientist, to
equal to those of the whole scientific community. Propagandist n ranged between 1 and their total possible
pulls.
25These results are for 10 scientists, n = 10 for scientists, pB = .55, and policy makers listening to half of
scientists.
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Figure 6: Propagandists with more resources are better able to mislead policy makers.
this experiment would support the better theory B are quite high, leaving the propagandist
with nothing to disseminate. In general, the propagandist should choose the smallest n they
can get away with.
Figure 7 shows this effect. For propagandists with resources to gather 50 data points,
the smaller the studies they run, the worse the eventual beliefs of the policy makers. If
propagandists run a few, good studies, they are unable to mislead anyone.26
This observation actually has an analog in the previous set of results on propagandists
who selectively share others’ data rather than gathering their own. In that model, given a set
of available resources for a community, it is better to use these to run fewer, better studies
than to run many less well-powered ones. We can observe this by comparing how policy
makers do given communities that have a finite amount of resources distributed differently.
Figure 8 demonstrates this. The scientific network, in this figure, has the resources to gather
a total of 100 data points each round. This is divided up by the number of scientists involved
in exploring the phenomenon so that, for example, 10 scientists gather 10 data points each
or two scientists gather 50 data points each. Without a propagandist policy makers develop
successful beliefs regardless of how resources are allocated. As the individual studies get
smaller, though, the propagandist is increasingly able to take advantage of the stochasticity
involved in gathering data to forward their agenda. Small studies mean confused policy
makers.
26These results are for 10 scientists, n = 10 (for scientists), policy makers listening to all scientists, and
pB = .55.
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Figure 7: Propagandists who use their resources to perform small studies are better at misleading policy
makers.
5. Journalists as Unwitting Propagandists
In the two treatments we have discussed so far, the propagandist has adopted strategies
intended to influence the policy makers’ beliefs. In both cases, we found that the propagan-
dist can succeed, at least under some circumstances. The basic mechanism at work in both
strategies is that the propagandist endeavors to bias the total body of evidence that the
policy makers see. They do not do this through fraud, or even by sampling from a different
distribution than the other scientists (as in Holman and Bruner [2015]). Instead, they do it
by choosing results so that the total evidence available, even though it was all drawn from
a fixed distribution, does not reflect the statistics of that distribution. What these results
show is that in many cases, particularly when evidence is relatively difficult to get or equiv-
ocal, it is essential that policy makers (and the public) have access to a complete, unbiased
sampling of studies. This suggests that curation, or even partial reporting, of evidence can
lead to epistemically poor results.
But propagandists are not the only agents who regularly curate scientific results. Non-
malicious actors can also play this role. For instance, journalists often select scientific studies
to feature in articles. Few journalists are experts in the relevant science, and in any case, the
goal is rarely to give a uniform and even-handed characterization of all available evidence.
To the contrary, journalistic practices often encourage, or even require, journalists to share
either only the most striking, surprising, or novel studies; or else, when they choose to
share a study on a controversial topic, to endeavor to be “fair” by sharing research that
supports both sides. Indeed, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had
an official policy, from 1949 to 1987, that required broadcast news to present controversial
topics of public interest in a “balanced” manner. In practice, this meant giving roughly
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Figure 8: Policy makers do better when fixed resources are allocated to a few, good studies rather than
many with small samples.
equal time to multiple perspectives. The policy was known as the “Fairness Doctrine”.
Oreskes and Conway [2010] argue that this Doctrine became a tool of the tobacco industry’s
propagandists, who used it to insist that pro-industry science get publicized.
To study the effects of the Fairness Doctrine, we consider the following modification of
the models we have considered thus far.27 The network structures remain the same, but
in place of the propagandist, we have a “journalist”, who like the propagandist can see all
of the scientists’ results and can communicate with all of the policy makers. In this case,
we suppose that the policy makers receive all of their information from the journalist, and
consider different ways in which the journalist might share that data.
Suppose, for instance, that the journalist—abiding by the Fairness Doctrine—shares two
results from the network of scientists each round, one of which supports theory B, and one of
which supports theory A. More precisely: we suppose that each round, the journalist chooses
randomly among all of the results that support theory A and all that support theory B. In
rounds where no results support one of the two theories, the journalist shares the result they
shared the previous round (capturing the idea that sometimes journalists need to search past
data to find something to adequately represent the “other side”), unless there has never been
a result favoring a given theory, in which case the journalist shares only one result. What
we find is that this addition artificially slows the policy-makers’ acceptance of theory B.
27We also considered a version of the model in which the journalist only published results that were
sufficiently “surprising” in the sense that the journalist judged them to have had a low probability of
occurring. For some parameter values, this sort of journalistic practice led policy makers to accept the
wrong theory. But we deemed the results to be ambiguous, because they depended sensitively on the value
of n chosen.
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To show this, it is most informative to compare the policy makers’ beliefs under the
action of this journalist (Fair) with what one would find if (a) the journalist shared two
randomly selected pieces of data each round (Random) and (b) the journalist simply shared
all available evidence each round (All). We find that (on average across runs) the Fairness
Doctrine never improves the epistemic performance of the policy makers, and for many
parameter values, policy makers receiving evidence from a journalist abiding by the Fairness
Doctrine end up with beliefs substantially less accurate than under conditions (a) or (b).
In all cases we consider, the policy makers’ beliefs still tend towards the truth (whenever
the scientists’ beliefs do), but they do so much more slowly.28 In this sense, then, the “fair”
journalist mimics the propagandist under the conditions where they are losing the tug-of-war
for policy makers’ beliefs, but nonetheless slow the policy makers’ progress.
Figure 9 shows average policy maker beliefs when scientists reach consensus on the true
belief for complete networks under different parameter values.29 Data points are for simula-
tions where journalists share Fair, Random, or All data as described above. The trend line
shows the average beliefs across parameters under each condition. As is evident, when jour-
nalists share all the data, policy maker beliefs are very accurate. With less data available—
two random sets of data—their convergence to true beliefs is slowed. Under fair reporting,
policy makers converge to true beliefs much more slowly, since they see a result that supports
theory A every time they see a result supporting B. The strength of this effect is dependent
on parameter values, but, as mentioned, fair reporting only worsens, and never improves,
policy maker beliefs in comparison to reporting randomly or reporting all data.
Journalists are not the only actors who perform data curation. University faculty, when
teaching courses, may endeavor to give a panoptic and even-handed view of a field, but they
will not be able to share all available relevant data with a class. Literature reviews and
survey articles also curate data, commenting on its quality and selecting what seems most
relevant or significant. The mechanisms by which researchers and university instructors
select material to present are arguably motivated by epistemic considerations—they seek
to give a compact overview that supports the views they believe are best supported, given
the total evidence that they have seen—but it is hard to see how they can do this without
using their own beliefs—which may be influenced by various factors—to guide the choices.
And so, it is not clear that even this sort of curation is certain to accurately track the
statistics of the total available evidence. In this way, even independent researchers, in their
teaching and writing, can unwittingly act as propagandists. In addition, it has been widely
observed that scientists regularly fail to publish negative or null results. This ‘file drawer’
effect biases the pool of evidence available to the entire community, and has already been
28When policy makers see one result supporting B and one supporting A each round, on average the result
supporting B is still stronger since this is in fact the better arm. So they learn the truth eventually.
29We chose a representative set of data points including all combinations of K = 6, 10, 20, pB = .55, .6, .7,
and n = 5, 10, 20. As in the previous models, initial policy maker beliefs were skeptical. Complete networks
demonstrated the effect more strongly because cycle networks are slow to converge and thus there is more
time for policy makers to learn true beliefs even under ‘fair’ reporting. But even with cycle networks the
effects of fair reporting were always neutral or negative.
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Figure 9: ‘Fair’ reporting slows policy makers from reaching accurate beliefs.
shown to potentially have negative effects on scientific beliefs (Romero [2016]).30
6. Conclusion
We have now considered two aspects of the Tobacco Strategy as described by Oreskes and
Conway. We take the results we have presented to provide strong evidence that the Tobacco
Strategy can work, in the sense that biasing the total evidence presented to a group of agents
can lead those agents to converge to the incorrect belief. Of course, modeling alone cannot
establish that this did happen in the case of tobacco industry propaganda efforts. But when
you combine the modeling results we have presented with the careful historical analysis and
arguments offered by Oreskes and Conway [2010], there are strong reasons to believe that
the Tobacco Strategy was an important causal factor in the long delay between when a
link between cigarettes and cancer was established by the medical research community, and
large-scale changes in regulation and public attitudes. Moreover, we take it that if these
strategies have succeed in the past, they are very likely to succeed now and in the future.31
30See also Ioannidis [2005].
31Returning one more to the themes of notes 4 and 8: we emphasize that, at very least, these models
provide “how-possibly” information: the processes we decribe with these models can possibly occur. Fur-
thermore, as we argue here, the theoretical and historical knowledge developed by Oreskes and Conway
increases our confidence that these processes have been important ones in the real world. As noted, we
cannot be sure that this is the case. But we do not take this to be a special problem for models of this sort.
With almost any sort of scientific exploration, including experimental and other empirical work, conclusions
are drawn from data via theoretically supported inference. (See Longino and Doell [1983] for more on this
point.) In this case, we draw (conservative) inferences based on a combination of modeling and historical
work.
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What is perhaps most interesting about the results we have presented is not that they
show what can work, but rather the insight they provide into how those strategies work.
As we have emphasized above, in our discussion on unwitting propagandists, the basic
mechanism at play in our models is that the propagandist biases the total evidence on
which the policy-makers update their beliefs. The fact that each result that is shared is, in
some sense, “real” ends up being irrelevant, because it is the statistical properties of the total
available evidence that matter. For this reason, we see that producing results favorable to
industry—say, through industry funding—is not necessary to manufacture favorable public
beliefs, at least in cases where the evidence is probabilistic and spurious results are possible.
On this point: one might have expected that actually producing biased science would
have a stronger influence on public opinion than merely sharing others’ results. But when
one compares the two treatments we consider above, there are strong senses in which the less
invasive, more subtle strategy of selective sharing is more effective than biased production,
all things considered, particularly when the scientific community is large and the problem
at hand is difficult (or the power of generic experiments is low). The reason is that such a
scientific community will produce, on its own, plenty of research that, taken without proper
context, lends credence to falsehoods. Merely sharing this already-available evidence is cost-
effective, and much less risky than producing one’s own research—which, after all, can cost
a great deal to produce, fail to generate the desired results, and ultimately be disqualified
or ignored because of the association with industry. From this point of view, producing
industry science (or even outright fraud) is simply not worth it. In many cases, another
more effective, less expensive, and more difficult to detect strategy is available.
Indeed, if industrial interests do wish to spend their money on science, perhaps rather
than producing their own results and publishing them selectively, they would do better to
adopt a different strategy, which Holman and Bruner [2017] have called “industrial selec-
tion”. The idea behind industrial selection is that there are many experimental protocols,
methodologies, and even research questions that scientists may adopt, often for their own
reasons. Some protocols may tend to produce more industry-friendly results than others.32
Industrial selection involves identifying methods already present among the community of
scientists that tend to favor one’s preferred outcome, and then funding scientists who al-
ready use those methods. This extra funding works to amplify these scientists’ results, by
allowing them to publish more, perform higher powered studies, and train more students
who will go on to produce consonant results. Indeed, there is a strong potential feedback
effect between industrial selection and selective sharing: by increasing the number of am-
bient industry-favorable results in a scientific literature, and then further amplifying those
results by sharing them selectively, propagandists can have an even stronger effect.
It is worth emphasizing that industrial selection does not require some scientists to have
adopted bad or unreliable research methods; it may also just be that they have focused on
32Holman and Bruner [2017] consider, for instance, the case of a class of drugs intended to stop heart
failure (Moore [1995]). In that case, studies that used reducing arrhythmia as a proxy for preventing heart
failure found that the drugs were highly successful, whereas studies that directly measured death rates from
heart failure later showed that the drugs were substantially increasing the likelihood of death. Industry
swayed scientific practice by funding the former type of study, but not the latter.
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research topics that promote an industrial agenda. For instance, Oreskes and Conway [2010,
p. 17] describe how the Tobacco Industry Research Council supported the work of noted
asbestos researcher Wilhelm C. Hueper of the National Cancer Institute. Hueper’s research
was not methodologically flawed; to the contrary, it very convincingly established the (real)
link between lung cancer and asbestos. But for the tobacco industry, it was valuable to have
evidence that other environmental factors played a role in lung cancer, since that could be
used to obfuscate the role their own product played. Taken together, then, selective sharing
and industrial selection suggest those interested in dampening industry influence should
turn their attention to the more subtle ways propagandists can come to bias epistemic
communities. This will to a certain extent require philosophers of science to reorient their
focus, as extant work tends to address explicit, direct ways industry can impact inquiry.
It is natural to ask, given the past success of the Tobacco Strategy and the results we
have described, whether there are ways in which policy makers or members of the public
can protect themselves against a propagandist using the methods described. Of course,
one natural suggestion is to stop listening to propagandists. But this is difficult to do, in
large part because propagandists pose as (or, in some cases, are) credentialed scientists.33
Another possibility, perhaps more realistic, is to gather evidence from as many scientists as
possible: as we discuss above, policy makers connected to more scientists tend to do better,
because the propagandist has to produce more evidence to effectively influence such policy
makers’ beliefs.34 Connecting to many scientists may also allow policy makers to to identify
propagandists on statistical grounds: indeed, as Holman and Bruner [2015] point out, in
some cases it may be possible to identify biased agents by comparing the statistics of their
results with those of other agents in their network. Finally, and along similar lines, it might
also be possible, at least in some circumstances, for policy makers to adjust their updating
rule to accommodate the possibility that some of the evidence they receive is exaggerated,
filtered, or otherwise intended to mislead.35 On the other hand, as O’Connor and Weatherall
[2017] show, some apparently reasonable heuristics for updating belief in light of unreliable
sources can lead to bad epistemic outcomes, including stable polarization. We think that
it would be valuable, in future work, to study how these latter two reactions might be
implemented, and how and when they would be effective.
We will conclude by noting a few ways in which the incentive structure of science con-
tributes to the success of the would-be propagandist, particularly when employing the se-
lective sharing strategy. As we noted above, selective sharing is most effective when (a) the
problem is difficult (in the sense that pB is close to .5); (b) the number of data points per
scientist per round is small; (c) there are many scientists working on a given problem; and
33Indeed, perhaps the most striking message of Oreskes and Conway [2010] is that the most effective
propagandists have been prestigious scientists, often coming from different fields, with a political ax to
grind.
34We note that connecting to more scientists was particularly effective in the selective sharing treatment
when “double-counting” was eliminated, suggesting that policy makers would do well to attend to cases
where a small number of studies are used repeatedly to prove a point, when other studies are also available.
35We are grateful to David Manheim [2018] for emphasizing this latter possibility, which is also quite close
to what Holman and Bruner [2015] propose.
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(d) policy makers are connected to few scientists. This situation interacts with how scien-
tists are rewarded for their work in complex, troubling ways.36 For instance, although there
are some incentives for scientists to make their work accessible and to try to communicate
it with the public and policy makers, it continues to be the case that academic scientists are
evaluated on the basis of their research productivity—and there are sometimes reputational
hazards associated with “popularizing” too much. This sort of effect can limit the number
of scientists to whom policy makers are connected.
But a more troubling way in which propaganda and incentives intersect concerns the role
of low-powered studies. Scientists are strongly encouraged to publish research articles, and to
do so often. Moreover, publishing positive results is strongly preferred to null results. Finally,
scientists work with limited funds that they must use to meet many demands. All of these
considerations lead to strong incentives to run studies with relatively low power (particularly,
fewer data points) whenever possible (Smaldino and McElreath [2016]).37 Of course, most
scientific fields recognize that, all else being equal, higher powered studies are more rigorous,
more reliable, and make for all-around better science. But there is little incentive, and
often few resources, for individual scientists to produce consistently high quality studies.
And as we have seen, low powered studies are more likely to spuriously support erroneous
conclusions. In cases where industry is not involved, this is not as worrying: spurious results
can be detected via meta-analysis. But in the presence of a propagandist, they become a
powerful tool in shaping public belief.
Discussions of low-powered science often focus on their role in controversies about par-
ticular results, in the context of the so-called “replication crisis” in the behavioral sciences
(and especially psychology) (Open Science Collaboration [2015]). And the regular publica-
tion and acceptance of ultimately incorrect results is certainly worrying. But the arguments
and results we have given here suggest that even more is at stake: the same sorts of con-
ditions that led to a replication crisis in the first place also provide extra fodder for indus-
trial propaganda. This makes reshaping scientists’ incentives to publish many, low-powered
“least-publishable units” crucial to foiling propagandists. For instance, scientists should be
granted more credit for statistically stronger results—even in cases where they happen to be
null. Scientists should not be judged on the number of publications they produce, but on the
quality of the research in those articles, so that a single publication with a very high powered
study, even if it shows a null result, should be “worth” more than many articles showing
surprising and sexy results, but with low power. Similar reasoning suggests that, given some
fixed financial resources, funding bodies should allocate those resources to a few very high-
36Previous authors have assumed that scientists are motivated by a quest for credit, in the same way
normal people seek money or goods. ‘Credit economy’ models have been used, for example, to show why
scientists might divide labor (Kitcher [1990]) or commit fraud (Bright [2017]).
37The ubiquity of low-powered studies in some fields, such as neuroscience (Button et al. [2013]; Szucs
and Ioannidis [2017]), ecology (Lemoine et al. [2016]), and evolutionary biology (Hersch and Phillips [2004]),
for instance, has been remarked upon and widely discussed within those fields. Smaldino and McElreath
[2016] perform a meta-analysis of work in the behavioral sciences over the last 60 years and argue that
despite repeated calls to increase power, little change has occurred. In addition, they show why scientific
communities might move towards producing low quality, low effort studies.
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powered studies, rather than splitting it up into many small grants with only enough funding
to run lower-powered studies. Or a more democratic alternative might involve scientists who
work together to generate and combine smaller studies before publishing, making it more
difficult for the propagandist to break off individual, spurious results.
Appendix A. Semi-analytic results
Here we describe a semi-analytic treatment of the expected progress of the models presented
in section 3.
Consider a population of K scientists each performing n trials each round, solving a
problem with pB = .5 + . Consider a policy maker connected to k scientists, with credence
Bt at time t in the true proposition that arm B is advantageous. This observer will update
her beliefs by conditionalization in light of two sources of evidence, from the scientists she
is connected to and from the propagandist. Thus, at the end of the round, we will have:
B(t+1) = YP × YS ×Bt, (A.1)
where YS represents the contribution from scientists and Yp represents the contribution from
the propagandist. What are these contributions on average?
In a generic round of play, the average result for each scientist performing the informative
action should be E = n∗pB, i.e., the expectation value for n draws from a binomial distribu-
tion with probability pB. We estimate Ys by supposing that the policy maker receives, from
each scientist performing action B that they are connected to, the average (i.e., expected)
result, and update. This yields:
YS =
(
P (n ∗ (.5 + )|H)
P (n ∗ (.5 + ))
)r∗k
(A.2)
where r ≤ 1 is the fraction of scientists in the population performing the informative action,
so r ∗ k ≤ k approximates the number of scientists connected to the observer who are
performing the informative action. Here H is the policy maker’s hypothesis about the
success rate of arm B. When multiplied by the current belief, Bt, as in equation A.1, this
is just Bayes rule for the expected evidence. Notice that this equation does not account for
the fact that B will change as an agent updates on different sets of evidence within a time
step. We should think of this approximation as most useful for cases where B is changing
slowly.
One can show by direct computation that YS reduces to:
YS =
(
1
Bt + (1−Bt)X
)r∗k
, (A.3)
where
X =
(
1− 2
1 + 2
)2n
.
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Observe that X < 1, and so for any value of Bt, YS > 1. It follows that updating on
evidence from the scientists will, on average, increase credence that arm B is preferable.
Moreover, one can see that as n and  each increase, X will decrease, and thus YS will
increase. Likewise, YS will increase as r, the number of scientists testing the preferred arm,
increases, and as k, the number of scientists a policy maker listens to, increases. Of course,
in the actual model stochastic effects can defeat this; we are describing average behavior.
Note that as Bt decreases, YS also becomes larger, so as observers become more skeptical,
evidence from scientists will become more powerful. Importantly this means that a set of
parameter values alone will not determine the average behavior of the model: the belief
state of a policy maker Bt and the belief states of the scientists, as represented by r, will
influence which way policy maker beliefs trend.
Now consider YP . Here we consider all (and only) spurious results produced by the
population of scientists each round. First, observe that we can calculate a rate at which
these will occur if all scientists perform the informative action, given by z = P (x < n/2)×K,
where x is the number of times arm B pays off. This expression is just the probability of
getting a spurious result—one that suggests PB < .5—times the number of scientists in the
population. For instance, for even n, we have:
P (x < n/2) =
n/2−1∑
i=0
n!
i!(n− i)!(PB)
i(1− PB)n−i (A.4)
This is the sum of the probabilities of drawing each possible x < n/2 from a binomial
distribution with n draws and PB.
We can also calculate an expectation value for such spurious draws, E˜, which is given
by (again for even n):
E˜ =
1
P (x < n/2)
n/2−1∑
i=0
in!
i!(n− i)!(PB)
i(1− PB)n−i (A.5)
This equation multiplies the value of each possible spurious draw, i, by the probability
of that draw, conditional on the assumption that the draw will be spurious.
This leads to an estimate for YP of:
YP =
(
1
Bt + (1−Bt)X˜
)r∗z
, (A.6)
where now
X˜ =
(
1− 2
1 + 2
)2E˜−n
Once again, r is the fraction of the population of scientists performing the informative action,
while z, remember, is the rate of spurious results. Observe that, by definition E˜ < n/2, and
so whatever else is the case (2E˜ − n) < 1, so X˜ > 1, which means YP is always less than 1.
Hence the propagandist will always tend to decrease the observer’s confidence in the true
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proposition, and this effect will be stronger when more scientists take the informative action
and the rate of spurious results is higher (more on this shortly).
Beyond these observations, it is harder to analyze the dependence of YP on other pa-
rameters, on account of the complexity of the function E˜. An analytic simplification of
the expression for E˜ is apparently not available, but a numerical analysis reveals that for
small , E˜ is very well approximated for sufficiently large n by a linear function in n, of
the form E˜ = −.62 + 0.47n. (This expression is determined by taking a linear best fit in
Mathematica.) Thus we have:
X˜ =
(
1− 2
1 + 2
)−.06n−1.24
(A.7)
We see that as  becomes larger, X˜ becomes smaller (i.e., approaches 1), and thus YP ap-
proaches 1, so that the propagandist is less effective. Notice though that as n increases in
this equation, X˜ becomes larger, thus YP gets smaller, so the propagandist gets more effec-
tive. Thus n influences YP in two, countervailing ways. A large n makes z, the probability
of a spurious result, smaller. On the other hand, when spurious results do occur, they are
more convincing for large n. In addition, X˜ tends to grow slowly in n and whether the
propagandist ends up swaying the observer depends on the relative scaling of YP and YS
with n, which in turn depends on . We also have that, as Bt approaches 1, YP approaches
1, so that the propagandist becomes less effective. (Thus, both the propagandist and the
scientists are more effective when policy makers have low credence in arm B.)
A final consideration concerns z, the rate of spurious results. Clearly as z increases,
the propagandist becomes more effective. This will happen as K, the number of scientists,
increases. (Though if policy makers listen to all the scientists, k will increase as K does,
strengthening YS as well.) The rate z will also increase as r, the fraction of scientists
performing the informative action, increases, though an increase in r will increase both YS
and YP . There is also a dependence in z on P (x < n/2). It is difficult to get a good
first order approximation for this function, but by studying plots one can characterize some
qualitative features. In general, for fixed n, increasing  decreases P (x < n/2), and thus
decreases z, making the propagandist less successful.
For sufficiently large n, we find that as n increases, P (x < n/2) decreases, again making
the propagandist less effective. This is what one would expect: the probability of spurious
results decreases as n increases. But what is surprising is that for small n, there is a regime
in which increasing n actually increases P (x < n/2). For sufficiently large  (say > .1 or so),
this regime is a small part of n-space. But for small  (say,  ≈ .001), P (x < n/2) actually
increases with n for all values of n that we study. So increasing n under these circumstances
makes the propagandist more effective. Again, an increase in n also makes scientists more
effective, so the overall influence of n will depend on whether it increases YP or YS to a
greater degree.
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